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AVOIDING A SUBPRIME-LIKE CRISES IN
MICROFINANCE: LESSONS FROM THE
MEXICAN AND BOLIVIAN EXPERIENCE
Pamela Das*
ABSTRACT
Starting in 2007, the United States began feeling the effects of the "sub-
prime mortgage crises," which ultimately contributed to a devastating
global recession. As governments and businesses reflect upon the causes
and remedies of this crisis, one must ask whether the increasing commer-
cialization of microfinance worldwide will cause a similar crisis. Because
micro finance is the extension of credit to individuals who are considered
unbankable by most commercial financial institutions, microfinance deliv-
ery inherently involves risky lending. The commercialization of
microfinance begs the question whether the poor will ultimately be ex-
ploited by these businesses in order to maximize profits, a driving force that
was clearly present in the collapse of the subprime credit market.
To shed light on this issue, this paper looks to at the evolution and cur-
rent state of microfinance in Mexico and Bolivia. Both of these Latin
American countries have extremely profitable MFIs within their borders
that operate in drastically different business climates. Mexico has a highly
deregulated and stratified micro finance market, where commercialized
MFIs impose interest rates close to 100%. Bolivia, on the other hand, has a
more regulated market with one of the lowest interest rates in Latin
America.
By looking at Mexico and Bolivia's experience with microfinance, this
paper hopes to accomplish a number of things. First, through giving a
snapshot of the evolution and organizational structure of microfinance, the
reader should have a greater overall understanding of microfinance deliv-
ery in Latin America. Additionally, this paper also attempts to analyze
whether the increasing commercialization in the field has made
microfinance into a profit-making tool that comes at the expense of the
poor. Ultimately, in using the Mexican and Bolivian example, this paper
hopes to recommend a sustainable structure for microfinance that will not
only continue to service the poor but will also avoid creating another sub-
prime-like crises.
* Pamela Das is a Briefing Attorney for the Texas Court of Appeals Fifth District.
J.D., Southern Methodist University; M.P.H.-Epidemiology, Boston University;
B.A.-Economics, Wellesley College
820 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 15
OUTLINE
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MICROFINANCE LANDSCAPE OF LATIN
AMERICA
II. MODALITIES OF MICROFINANCE: THE IMPORTANCE OF
MICROFINANCE TO THE POOR AND THE DIFFERENT METHODS OF
MICROFINANCE DELIVERY
A. The Relationship Between Microfinance and the Alleviation
of Poverty
B. The Evolution of Microfinance in Latin America: From In-
formal Networks to Large For-Profit Microfinance Intuitions
C. Financial Services Offered to the Poor through Microfinance:
Beyond Microcredit
D. The Current Modalities of Microfinance Delivery
III. MEXICAN MICROFINANCE: LESSONS REGARDING COMMERCIALI-
ZATION, PROFITABILITY, AND ACCESS FOR THE POOR
A. Microfinance Delivery: Services through the Banking and
Non-Banking Sectors
B. Regulation and Supervision in the Mexican Microfinance
Industry
C. The Compartamos Example: Profitability in Microfinance,
Interest Rates, and Exploitation of the Poor
IV. BOLIVIAN MICROFINANCE: LESSONS REGARDING SUSTAINABILITY
OF MICROFINANCE DELIVERY
A. The Organization of Microfinance Delivery
B. The History and Regulation of Microfinance Institutions
C. The BancoSol Example: The Profitability of
Commercialization
D. Microfinance and Economic Crises in Bolivia
V. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Reflections on the Subprime Crises: Lessons for
Microfinance
B. A Need for Balanced Government Regulation
C. A Need For Greater Infrastructure
D. Recommendations for Microfinance Institutions: Balancing
Profits with Purpose
E. Concluding Remarks
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MICROFINANCE
LANDSCAPE OF LATIN AMERICA
ICROFINANCE in Latin America has mushroomed over the
past few decades into a booming industry. In fact, on a global
scale, Latin American Microfinance Institutes (MFIs) "have
more assets, leverage more equity, and attract more commercial invest-
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ments than MFIs in other regions."'  Microfinance began in Latin
America through the actions of grassroots organizations offering small-
scale loans to the poor. The concept of offering financial services to low
income individuals was heralded as a mechanism for not only alleviating
poverty but also for increasing economic productivity for the country as a
whole.
Microfinance quickly transformed from an informal network of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and small moneylenders into an in-
dustry of large multinational MFIs. Currently, MFIs make up an undeni-
able segment of the Latin American financial markets. The growing
commercialization of microfinance offers unique challenges and opportu-
nities for the Latin American poor. While the growth of MFIs allows for
the expansion of services and greater resources for the poor, the commer-
cialization of microfinance also has allowed objectives of growth, efficacy,
and profit to increasingly shape the current landscape.
This paper analyzes the growth and commercialization of microfinance
in two different Latin American countries: Mexico and Bolivia. The
Mexican example is illustrative of the transformation that the
microfinance sector has experienced in Latin America. Over the past two
decades, the Mexican microfinance industry has greatly expanded from
small regional NGO lenders to large-scale for profit microfinance institu-
tions. Currently, four microfinance institutions (Caja Popular, Com-
partamos, Independencia and FINCA) serve almost 1.2 million clients
and "control eighty percent market-share of the Mexican microfinance
market."'2 Despite the global recession hitting Mexico's banking industry,
Compartamos, one of Mexico's most successful MFIs, continues to grow
rapidly.3 According to the Inter-American Development Bank, one ma-
jor reason that Compartamos continues to grow is because of the high
interest rates that it charges on its loans.4 In 2005, the interest rate yield
was about eighty-six percent and the rate paid by borrowers was close to
100 %.5 The rapid and sustained growth of Compartamos has increased
access and diversified financial services. But the high interest rates and
increased profitability of Compartamos raises two important questions:
(1) will success be sustainable, and (2) does the strategy employed by the
company exploit the poor. Some critics of the commercialization warn
that high interest rates will doom the microfinance industry to the same
1. MICROFINANCE INFORMATION EXCHANGE, BENCHMARKING LATIN AMERICAN
MICROFINANCE 1 (2003).
2. Roberto Valdez, The Proliferation of Microfinance Institutions in Mexico and the
Village Banking Experience 12 (Dec. 6, 2006) (unpublished working paper, on file
with the Univ. of Ariz.).
3. Adam Thomson, Microfinancing Still Resilient in Mexico Financial Times, Feb. 26,
2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/37addbce-0270-llde-b58b-000077bO7658.html?
nclick check=1.
4. Lucy Conger, The Compartamos IPO: Pushing the Envelope on Doing Well by
Doing Good (IADB April 16 2008), available at www.iadb,org/news.detail.cfm?
language=English&id=4571.
5. Id.
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fate as the U.S. subprime mortgage crises. Whether this is true or not is a
question for debate.
While Mexican MFIs have the highest interest rates in Latin America,
Bolivia, after Ecuador, has the second lowest interest rate for
microfinance. 6 In addition to low interest rates, the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank ranked Bolivia number one for the best microfinance
business environment. 7 The Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) noted
that compared to other Latin American countries, Bolivia has a regula-
tory environment that "reflects the proactive, gradualist posture towards
fostering the development of microfinance of regulatory authorities. ' '8
The EIU also commented that Bolivia has strong institutional develop-
ment that is symbolic of microfinance evolution in Bolivia from non-regu-
lated NGOs "toward improved regulation and self-regulation of
governance and transparency practices and toward successive innovations
in the range of services."9
Microfinance in Mexico and Bolivia occurs in very disparate business
climates. This article, therefore, dissects the histories and microfinancing
practices of both countries to give the reader a greater understanding of
the different evolutionary paths that the microfinance industry can take.
Additionally, this paper also generally addresses the effects of high inter-
est rates and regulation of the microfinance industry both on a micro and
macroeconomic level. Through this analysis, this paper hopes to shed
light as to whether microfinance, with its increasing commercial presence,
still remains a positive option for the Latin American poor.
In Part II, this paper will explore the general modalities of
microfinance delivery and the relationship of microfinance to the allevia-
tion of poverty. Part III and Part IV of this paper will look more specifi-
cally at microfinance in Mexico and Bolivia, respectively. In both these
sections, the paper will explore the historical origins, growth, commercial-
ization and regulation that exist in the microfinance sector for these coun-
tries. In Part V, the concluding remarks, this paper will reflect upon the
U.S. subprime crises and use the Mexican and Bolivian experience with
microfinance to recommend a sustainable structure for the industry. Ulti-
mately this paper hopes to recommend strategies that will allow
microfinance to withstand economic downturns and continue to service
the poor in an increasingly commercialized market.
6. Id. In 2006, Bolivia's annual interest rate for microfinancing was twenty-one per-
cent. INTER- DEVELOPMENT BANK, MICROFINANCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND CAR-
IBBEAN 2008 DATA UPDATE 1 (April 5, 2008). Ecuador's interest rate was 15.5%.
Id. at 5. On the other extreme, Mexico's annual interest rate for microfinancing
was 64.9%. Id.
7. Id. at 4. The measure for business environment scored thirteen different variables
in three different categories: regulatory framework, institutional development and
investment climate. Id. These three variables by percentage were forty percent,
forty percent, and twenty percent respectively. Id.
8. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, MICROSCOPE ON THE MICROFINANCE BUSINESS
IN LATIN AMERICA 2007 8 (2007).
9. Id.
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II. MODALITIES OF MICROFINANCE: THE IMPORTANCE OF
MICROFINANCE TO THE POOR AND THE DIFFERENT
METHODS OF MICROFINANCE DELIVERY
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MICROFINANCE AND THE
ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY
Microfinance developed as a means for poor people to gain access to
basic financial services because traditionally the banking sector deprived
poor people of access to credit. Microfinance has been defined as "bank-
ing the unbankables, bringing credit, savings and other essential financial
services within the reach of tens of-or rather hundreds of-millions of peo-
ple who are too poor to be served by regular banks, in most cases because
they are unable to offer sufficient collateral .... In general, banks are for
people with money, not for people without." 10
Mohammad Yunus, who received the Nobel Prize in 2006 for his work
in pioneering microfinance, described the role of microfinance in poverty
alleviation as follows:
"[Microcredit] is based on the premise that the poor have skills
which remain unutilized or underutilized. It is definitely not the lack
of skills, which make poor people.. .charity is not the answer to pov-
erty. It only helps poverty to continue. It creates dependency and
takes away the individual's initiative to break through the wall of
poverty. Unleashing of energy and creativity in each human being is
the answer to poverty.""11
Access to financial services is important to poverty alleviation because
it increases income and reduces vulnerability. For example, individuals
who are able to obtain microloans can use the money to explore en-
trepreneurial capabilities.' 2 Moreover, financial resources allow for
greater food security and increase access to sustainable housing, educa-
tion, and health care. 13 These actions in turn enable individuals to build
up wealth and rise from poverty. Microfinance is a means for self-em-
powerment because it permits individuals to have greater control over
their economic future. By encouraging economic freedom, microfinance
enables individuals to successfully tackle issues of domestic violence, ill-
ness, and unforeseeable catastrophes.
10. GERT VAN MAANEN, MICROCREDIT: SOUND BUSINESS OR DEVELOPMENT INSTRU-
MENT 17 (2004).
11. See Muhammad Yunus, Founder Grameen Bank, Address at the International
Seminar on Attacking Poverty with Microcredit (Jan. 8-9, 2003), available at http://
www.microfinancegateway.org/files/3642_Yunnus3.doc.
12. Global Trends in Microfinance and a Focus on Latin America: Public Hearing
Before the European Parliament (2005) (statement of Brigit Helms, Consultative
Group to Assist the Poor), available at www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/
20051011/femmlhelms-en.pdf.
13. See id.
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B. THE EVOLUTION OF MICROFINANCE IN LATIN AMERICA: FROM
INFORMAL NETWORKS TO LARGE FOR-PROFIT
MICROFINANCE INTUITIONS
Microfinance in Latin America, as in most other parts of the world,
began small and simple. Some of the very first microfinance "organiza-
tions" were informal networks of individuals offering credit to individuals
who had been turned away by banks for the lack of collateral. 14 In some
cases, these informal networks were groups of friends and neighbors,
where the role of lender and borrower were interchangeable. 15 In other
circumstances, individuals relied on local moneylenders who would offer
small loans on flexible but exorbitant terms. 16
From these roots sprung microfinance in the nonprofit sector. Because
the clients lacked collateral, non-profit organizations began relying on
other measures to determine credit-worthiness and encourage repay-
ment.1 7 For example, loans were often only given for entrepreneurial ac-
tivities, and the decision to lend was based on personal characteristics and
business cash flow. 18 To determine reliability, microfinance organizations
"would interview family, neighbors and business contacts."' 9 Second, to
encourage repayment, they would reward reliable clients "with larger
loans at lower interest rates."'20
By the 1990s, NGOs in Latin America became very successful at this
mechanism of financing "and started to grow rapidly."'21 The success of
these organizations had two very important implications. First, commer-
cial banks began paying serious attention to microfinance, realizing that
they make a profit through this practice.22 Moreover, the growth of
microfinance in the NGO sector, encouraged the transformation of many
NGOs "into professional financial institutions that specialize in
microfinance. ' '23 These organizations are former NGOs that have re-
ceived license by the country to operate as regulated and supervised fi-
nancial institutions. Today, the field of microfinance in Latin America
has greatly evolved from providing services through small NGOs to com-
mercial banks and large formal financial intermediaries. In 2000, banks
and specialized financial intermediaries "serve[d] as many clients and
provide[d] three times as much credit as the non-profit organizations. '24









23. Id. at 1-2.
24. Id. at 2.
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C. FINANCIAL SERVICES OFFERED TO THE POOR THROUGH
MICROFINANCE: BEYOND MICROCREDIT
When microfinance was first introduced to Latin America, financial
services were limited to microcredit, or the provision of small loans.
However, as microfinance became more successful, the services offered
greatly expanded. Today, microfinance institutions provide a wide array
of services including: "deposit services, credit lines and term loans, crop
and life insurance and money transfers. ' 25 Moreover, some institutions
have also allowed deposit services to allow individuals to save for impor-
tant occasions. 26 Because many individuals in Latin America emigrate,
MFIs introduced domestic transfers or international remittances that al-
low individuals to send money back to their home country.2 7 For exam-
ple, Banco Solidario, a MFI in Ecuador, offered a new product in 2002
called "mi familia, mi pais, mi regresso" which targeted Ecuadorians liv-
ing in Spain or Italy who wanted to send money to Ecuador, save for a
return, or buy a home in Ecuador.2 8 Since 2002 "this product has allowed
more than 62,000 clients access more than 19,000 sales locations in Spain
and Italy to bank with Banco Solidario. ' ' 29
D. THE CURRENT MODALITIES OF MICROFINANCE DELIVERY
1. The Credit Union Approach
The Credit Union approach is "one of the oldest modalities of
microfinance delivery" used in Latin America. 30 Credit unions or finan-
cial cooperatives are much more informal than commercial banks, but
they are still registered and subject to commercial law. 3 1 Credit unions
differ from commercial banks in that they are generally not regulated or
supervised under banking law. 32 Although credit unions were one of the
earliest forms of delivery, even today, they serve an important function
because they help households fill the gap left by commercial banks and
formal microfinance institutions. 33 Credit unions are member owned
non-profit institutions that provide financial services to members. In or-
der to be a member, the individual may have to be affiliated with a cer-
tain employment group of the community. Because there are no external
shareholders, funding primarily occurs through the members themselves.
The financial services offered are usually limited to savings and loan ser-





30. Heather Montgomery & John Weiss, Modalities of Microfinance Delivery in Asia
and Latin America: Lessons for the People's Republic of China, 1 (Asian Dev.
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vices and insurance.34
2. The NGO Approach
The NGO sector was the pioneer of modern microfinance. Because
many NGOs experienced success in extending microcredit to individuals
during the early 1990s, they transformed into formal financial in-
termediaries specializing in microfinance. 35 In Bolivia, for example,
Prodem, a successful MFI, was the first microfinance NGO in Latin
America to transform into a formal institution. Many NGO still exist in
the microfinance industry. The success of these NGOs seems to depend
on the size of the economy. LAEBA notes that outreach is greater for
smaller economies such as Bolivia, rather than large economies like Mex-
ico and Brazil.36
3. The Banking Approach
Commercial banks are the newest players in microfinance delivery.
The banking modality includes many different types of institutions: (1)
transformed microfinance NGOs; (2) government owned development
banks; (3) reformed state banks; (4) universal or commercial banks; and
(5) specialized financial institutions. 37 Because most banks can easily ac-
cess capital markets, these institutions are self-sustainable and usually
very profitable. Large for profit MFIs typically have much higher returns
than NGOs and credit unions. Notwithstanding their success, the pres-
ence of these for-profit institutions in microfinance is paradoxical because
the initial motivation behind microfinance is to service the poor. As
more and more NGOs transform into commercial banks, countries strug-
gle with determining the best method of regulation and supervision.
III. MEXICAN MICROFINANCE: LESSONS REGARDING
COMMERCIALIZATION, PROFITABILITY, AND
ACCESS FOR THE POOR
A. MICROFINANCE DELIVERY: SERVICES THROUGH THE BANKING
AND NON-BANKING SECTORS
The banking sector in Mexico as well as Mexico's large population
makes microfinance within this county very unique. Mexico's size lends
itself to greater stratification in microfinance delivery. The institutions
involved in microfinance range from large banks such as Banamax, which
has over forty billion dollars in assets, to small community based savings
and credit associations with only a few thousands in assets. 38 The formal





38. Jacques T. Loubi~re, Patricia L. Devaney & Elisabeth Rhyne, Supervising & Regu-
lating Microfinance in the Context of the Financial Sector Liberalization: Lessons
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Popular Financial Partnerships (specialized financial institutions), and
Bansefi, which is a government institution that provides saving services,
infrastructure development, financial and technical support to micro
banking institutions.39 Semi-formal sources of microfinance delivery are
NGOs that are sponsored under PRONAFIM. PRONAFIM, which
stands for National Program for Financing the Microentrepreneur, is a
government program that sponsors microfinance institutions and con-
nects these institutions with poor entrepreneurs.40 Through this arrange-
ment, PRONAFIM "aims to contribute to the establishment and
consolidation of the microfinancing institutions...,,41
1. The Banking Institutions
The Banking sector has played a huge role in microfinance delivery.
The banking institutions in Mexico have the largest value of assets; this
makes their scope and reach in microfinance much more extensive. Mex-
ico has two different types of banks involved in microfinance: universal
or development banks. At the end of 2006, there were thirty-two univer-
sal banks and six development banks.42 Development banks are mainly
owned by the government and are not driven by commercial purposes.
Rather, they are created to promote the development of specific sectors
such as transportation. In contrast to development banks, universal
banks are operated for commercial purposes and traditionally target cli-
ents with more collateral. These banks provide a number of services, in-
cluding savings, loans, and investment services. Universal banks in
Mexico own approximately 255.6 billion (USD) in assets. 43
A unique aspect of Mexican microfinancing through the banking sector
is the prevalence of foreign owned banks. Mexico's proximity to the
United States and regulatory environment has attracted foreign banks
into Mexico. 44 Many major U.S. and European banks have bought into
the Mexican banking system. For example, the U.S. bank Citigroup owns
Mexico's largest bank, Banamax.45 Foreign ownership of banks in Latin
America is not uncommon. However, foreign ownership in Mexico is
quite pronounced. 46 In fact, Mexico has only one bank that is predomi-
nately locally owned. One concern with the foreign ownership is how
these banks will weather international banking crises. The Wall Street
from Bolivia, Columbia and Mexico, Report to Tinker Foundation 20-23 (Aug
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=776905.
39. Janette Klaehn, Brigit Helms & Rani Deshpande, Mexico, Country-Level Savings
Assessment, Mar. 2006, http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2960/mexico-assess-
ment.pdf.
40. PRONAFIM website, http://www.pronafim.gob.mx/.
41. Id.
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Journal noted that Mexico has not been hard hit by the recent global
economic slowdown because Mexican banks did not engage in risky busi-
ness practices such as sub-prime lending.47 However, if a foreign bank
struggles, it may compromise the foreign ownership of the Mexican
banks. For example, the Wall Street Journal notes that there were specu-
lations that Citigroup was exploring selling Banamex as a result of the
U.S. banking crises.48
2. Non Bank Financial Institutions
Although the banking sector boasts more assets, the banking system
has played a very limited role in microfinance. Non-bank financial insti-
tutions are very important in microfinance delivery because they fill the
gap left by the banks. In fact, most microfinance delivery occurs through
the non-banking sector. As a consequence, specialized MFIs and NGOs
can serve as an important tool for the poor. The non-bank financial insti-
tutions include: (1) Financial Companies with limited corporate purpose
(SOFELEs); (2) Regulated Financial Companies with multiple corporate
Purpose (SOFOMEs); (3) Non-regulated Financial Companies with Mul-
tiple Corporate Purpose (SOFIPOs); (4) Savings and Loans Coopera-
tives; and (5) Popular Financial Partnerships.4 9
SOFELEs are financially regulated institutions that obtain funding
through the securities market and cannot receive funds from the public
through deposits.50 The services include direct loans, financial leasing,
and factoring. These services, however, can only be rendered to specific
authorized industries. One of the most notable SOFOLEs is Com-
partamos. Compartamos offers a wide range of services in rural Mexico
and boasts over 220,000 clients, making it the largest MFI in Latin
America.51 Compartamos began as an NGO but in 2000, it transformed
into a for-profit SOFELE.
SOFEMEs are much newer entities than SOFELEs. They are financial
institutions that were created by the government in 2006.52 Although
SOFELEs can only extend credit to specific industries, SOFEMEs can
extend credit to multiple sectors.53 In the next seven years, it is expected
that most if not all of the SOFELEs will be transformed into
SOFEMEs.54 Similar to SOFELEs, SOFEMEs cannot obtain funds
through deposits, but they may obtain funds from loans, offering of eq-
47. Dan Wilchins, Tim Dobbyn & Carol Bishopric, RTP-Update 2: Citigroup has Con-
sidered Selling Banamex Stake, WALL ST. J, Feb. 14, 2009, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/americasMergersNews/idUSN13121920090214.
48. Id.
49. Microfinance Gateway, Mexico: Country Specific Analysis, http://microfinance
gateway.com/resource-centers/reg-sup/micro-reg/country/28/?print=true.
50. Id.
51. Loubi~re, supra note 38, at 20.
52. Microfinance Gateway, Mexico, supra note 49.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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uity stakes, and debt instruments.5 5 Regulated SOFEMEs differ from un-
regulated SOFEMEs in that the regulated entities are partially or wholly
owned by another credit institution; therefore they are subject to banking
rules concerning supervision and prudential regulations. 56
Popular Financial Partnerships (SOFIPOs) are stock corporations with
a public purpose mission. 57 These entities render financial services to
members and non-members of the partnership. The services include sav-
ings and loans, facilitation of access to credit, provision of financing for
small and medium enterprises, and promotion of the "social and eco-
nomic well-being of their members in which they operate. ' '58 Depending
on the SOFIPOs assets and liabilities, these organizations can provide a
wide range of services to their clients. 59 Savings and Loan Cooperatives
differ from SOFIPOs in that the cooperatives only provide deposit taking
and granting of credit.60 In addition to the non-banking financial institu-
tions, NGOs also play an important part in microfinance delivery. These
organizations tend to be fairly small but they often service clients that
have been turned away by other financial institutions. NGOs in Mexico
only provide for deposit taking, and granting of credit among its
members. 61
B. REGULATION AND SUPERVISION IN THE MEXICAN
MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY
In 2001, the microfinance sector in Mexico was reorganized. In order
to consolidate microfinance delivery, in 2001, Mexico passed a law called
Ley de Ahorro y Credito Popular. This law allowed NGOs, financial orga-
nizations, saving cooperatives, and private assistance institutions to trans-
form into specialized MFIs.62 The law provided for the gradual
incorporation of non-banking financial institutions into a regulatory and
legal framework out of this law arose regulated institutions known as Eni-
tidades de Ahorra y Credito Popular (EACPs). These institutions were
either cooperative owned or individually owned as SOFIPOs. 63
These entities are supervised by federations which have been author-
ized by the Mexican Banking authority, the Comision Nacional Bancaria
y de Valores (CNBV). 64 In essence, these federations are various mem-
bers of MFIs that engage in self-regulation. The federations are charged
with the responsibility of creating prudential and non-prudential regula-
55. Id.
56. Microfinance Gateway, Mexico: Country-Specific Analysis, http://www.microfi-
nanceregulationcenter.org/resource-centers/reg-sup/country-info/mexico (last vis-






62. Loubire, supra note 38, at 20.
63. Id. at 21.
64. Id.
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tions. Through this program, the CNBV was able to delegate its supervi-
sory role, which resulted in major cost savings for the Government.
A major controversy with the federation system is with conflicts of in-
terest. Because the federations are composed of members of the MFIs
that it also supervises, there is a high likelihood that the federations can-
not be unbiased. Furthermore, federations have the power to create and
implement their own prudential regulations, which means that MFIs will
have to comply both with the rules promulgated by the CNBV and the
regulations instituted by the federations.65
In addition to the federation system, the 2001 law also created Bansefi,
a public savings bank which builds capacity for over 400 popular savings
and credit institutions.66 These institutions target poor and lower-income
groups that generally have no access to the commercial banking sector.
BANSEFI attempts to ensure that clients of savings and credit institu-
tions have access to safe and efficient financial services through various
expansion programs.67 Moreover, because the 2001 law only applies to
deposit taking institutions, the 2001 law attempted to create prudential
norms that effectively protect deposit. In order to offer protection, the
Mexican government requires minimum levels of assets and
capitalization. 68
Although Mexico does not have interest rate caps, licensure require-
ments and minimum capitalization amounts for banks are quite stringent.
This can result in high operational costs and cause an adverse incentive
against microfinance delivery in the banking sector.
C. THE COMPARTAMOS EXAMPLE: PROFITABILITY IN MICROFINANCE,
INTEREST RATES, AND EXPLOITATION OF THE POOR
The lack of interest rate limits and relatively relaxed governmental reg-
ulations in Mexico have allowed for-profit MFIs to impose annual inter-
est from fifty to 120%.69 These rates are extremely high when compared
to the worldwide average of thirty one percent for non-profit micro-lend-
ing institutions or the twenty-nine percent interest rate charged to Ameri-
cans with bad credit on credit card loans. 70 While economic justifications
for high interest rates exist, some challenge these business practices as
exploitative and ultimately harmful to the poor.
65. Id. at 22.
66. Lisa Taber, Carlos Cuevas, Juan Navarrete & Gabriela Zapata, Integrating the
Poor into the Mainstream Financial System: The BANSEFI and SAGARPA Pro-
gram in Mexico (World Bank 2004).
67. Id.
68. Loubi~re, supra note 38, at 23.
69. Keith Epstein & Geri Smith, The Ugly Side of Microlending, BUSINESSWEEK (Dec.
13, 2007).
70. Id.
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1. Pitfalls of the High Interest Rates
One of the major criticisms of the high interest rates is that it exploits
the poor because many of the clients of microfinance are unsophisticated
borrowers, and therefore, the repayment terms may not be sufficiently
explained. In fact, because Mexico does not require disclosure of interest
rates, many borrowers take these loans with minimal information and
without any clear understanding of the repayment terms. As one finan-
cial representative at Banco Azteca explained, "terms are explained to
them, maybe not as clearly as they should, but many don't understand....
They take on financial commitments they can't meet. '7 1
Even if clients initially take on impractical financial commitments,
microfinance has been a profitable business because low-income clients
tend to boast a fairly high repayment rate. This repayment, however,
may come at a cost. Under terms that many would consider usurious,
payment amounts can quickly double over a year or two. For example,
one Mexican couple that took out a loan for $920 from a large Mexican
MFI owed approximately $1485.00 for that loan by the next year.72 Be-
cause some may not be able to meet the demanding repayment terms,
individuals may engage in informal borrowing from loan sharks. 73 Mexi-
can law does not prohibit this type of informal lending despite the threat
of violence often associated with this practice.7 4
Moreover, low-income individuals without much collateral have very
few options for paying back these loans if the expected return from their
investment is not sufficient. For many, it may come down to the choice
between having food or paying back the loan. In addition, if an individ-
ual struggles to pay back a loan, the bank will seize whatever goods the
borrower owns. If the borrower has enough goods to cover the debt, the
bank will consider the debt repaid, and will not consider the borrower
defaulted. 75 This type of classification may be why the stated loan default
rate for many microfinance institutions is only about one to two
percent.76
2. Justifications for High Interest Rates and Increased
Commercialization
One of the major justifications for high interest rates is that the rates
are necessary to cover the high operational costs of lending small value
loans. 77 More specifically, many argue that high interest rates are neces-
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and profits. '78 Moreover, interest rates also reflect inflation. Inflation
can "add to the cost of microfinance by eroding microlender's equity. '79
While most of these justifications are reasonable, some take issue with
interest rates being used to increase profits.80
Notwithstanding the inherent skepticism with profit making in the
microfinance sector, to many economists, commercialization and profit-
making have been a positive force in the field. According to their view,
commercialization allows greater access and diversity in service. By hav-
ing shareholders and profits, it allows for greater self-sustainability and
faster growth.81 As such, many have disagreed on the propriety of gov-
ernment regulation, namely interest rate caps on MFIs.82 It is argued that
interest rate ceilings will discourage potential investors from supporting
microfinance and lead to a contraction of services and access. 83 Moreo-
ver, rate ceilings may also decrease creditworthiness of MFI, making it
harder for them to borrow to finance their operations. 84 Ultimately, it is
argued, that rate ceilings or restrictions on profits will cause MFIs to de-
sert the poor.85
3. Compartamos: Mexico's Most Successful MFI
Compartamos' success as a MFI demonstrates how profitable
microfinance delivery can be in Mexico. By the end of 2008, Com-
partamos reached one million borrowers and achieved almost eighty mil-
lion dollars in profits.86 The loan portfolio of Compartamos has grown to
almost 400 million.87 Currently, the MFI charges about a ninety percent
interest rate.88 The New York Times notes, however, that interest rates in
both the for-profit and non-profit MFIs are higher in Mexico as com-
pared to other microfinance interest rates around the world because of
high costs, inefficiencies and limited competition. 89 Notwithstanding the
generally high interest rates in Mexico, approximately 23.6% of Com-
partamos' interest income went to profits.90 If Compartamos reduced its
return on average equity to fifteen percent, which is the normal return for
Mexican Banks, the interest rate would drop to approximately sixty-eight
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. CGAP Reflections on the Compartamos Initial Public Offering: A Case Study on
Microfinance Interest Rates and Profits, Focus NOTE (Consultative Group to As-
sist the Poor (CGAP), Washington D.C.), June 2007 (hereinafter "CGAP Case
Study").
81. Id.
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percent.9 1
The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) noted that when
Compartamos was an NGO, the charging of high interest rates was defen-
sible because it could "overcharge" clients for the sake of more outreach
to the poor. 92 The surplus amount made by the NGO remained in the
NGO to service the poor.93 When Compartamos transformed into a for-
profit MFI in 2000, priorities of the institution may have also trans-
formed. Because private shareholders entered into the picture, the sur-
pluses made by the MFI no longer necessarily translated into direct
benefits for the poor.94 Rather, while most of the returns remained in the
MLFI for the expansion of services, some became modest dividends for
individual shareholders. 95 The debate about Compartamos' reached a
pinnacle in 2006 when Compartamos went public. 96 Compartamos was
the first MFI in Latin America to go public and will probably not be the
last. 97 The IPO produced huge profits for private investors. Many of the
investors, including the bank's top executives pocketed about 150 million
dollars from the sale. 98 In total, the IPO brought in about 458 million
dollars. 99 The Nobel laureate Mohammad Yunnus condemned the IPO
as a perversion of the industry. 10
Profit making in microfinance is not a controversial concept in itself.
Most microfinance specialists agree that profit allows for self-sus-
tainability and the expansion of services. However the average return for
self-sufficient organizations is about 5.5%.101 Compartamos makes al-
most four times that, with approximately 19.6% return on assets.10 2
There is no question that Compartamos' success has lead to a greater
expansion of services. In 2000, the MFI was serving about 60,000 clients
and at the end of 2008, Compartamos was providing financial access to
over 840,000 "unbankable" individuals.10 3 Despite Compartamos' rapid
growth, less than 1/3 of Mexico's working poor have any access to finan-
cial services at all. 10 4 Therefore, whether Compartamos' profitability is
the answer, or even an answer to effective microfinance delivery is
debatable.
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IV. BOLIVIAN MICROFINANCE: LESSONS REGARDING
SUSTAINABILITY OF MICROFINANCE DELIVERY
A. THE ORGANIZATION OF MICROFINANCE DELIVERY
Bolivia is known for its successful microfinance industry. Almost 100%
of the urban poor have access to financial services. 10 5 Microfinance deliv-
ery to the rural poor, however, has not been as successful. Bolivia's expe-
rience with microfinance is a textbook example of the liberalization that
was occurring all through Latin America. In its elementary phase,
microfinance delivery in Bolivia mostly occurred through the NGO sec-
tor.10 6 In the 1990s, however, microfinance regulations were greatly lib-
eralized and many of these NGOs transformed into regulated MFIs.10 7
Like Mexico, Bolivia's microfinance delivery is broken down into bank
and non-bank financial institutions. Because Bolivia eliminated public
sector banking in the mic-1980s all banks and financial institutions are
privately owned.' 0 8 Within the banking sector, Bolivia has thirteen com-
mercial banks and two specialized banks involved in microfinance.10 9 In
total, these banking institutions owned about sixty-five billion dollars in
assets. 11° One of the most famous banks involved in microfinance lend-
ing is BancoSol.
As for non-bank financial institutions, there are approximately fifty-
two of these institutions within Bolivia.111 The five different types of
non-bank financial institutions involved in microfinance delivery are: (1)
Private Financial Funds (FFPs), (2) open cooperatives, (3) mutual benefit
savings and home loan societies, (4) closed cooperatives and (5)
NGOs. n 2
In 1995, the Bolivian government created FFPs, or Fondos Financieros
Privados, to encourage NGOs with strong lending power to transform
into specialized commercial financial institutions.11 3 The FFP business
structure would allow organizations to take deposits, access wholesale
funds and commercial capital more easily and encourage effective man-
agement.11 4 The principal objective of these FFPs is to channel resources
to micro and small-scale borrowers both in rural and urban areas.1 15
Although FFPs can be run for profit, the other four types of non-bank
financial institutions are non-profit organizations involved in
microfinance delivery. For example, Mutual Benefit Savings and Home
105. Microfinanceregulationcenter.org, Regulation Home Page: Country Profiles: Bo-
livia, http://www.microfinanceregulationcenter.org/resource centers/reg-sup/coun-
try-info/bolivia (last visited July 8, 2009).
106. Loubi~re, supra note 38, at 2.
107. Id. at 14.
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Loans Societies (NFBIs) are set up as non-profit civil associations that
are authorized to carry out financial intermediation operations and pro-
vide financial services to the public.116 Open cooperatives are limited lia-
bility NFBIs, and therefore provide services to the public. 117 Closed
cooperatives, on the other hand, only provide financial operations for
members.1 18 The government does not require closed cooperatives to be
licensed. NGOs, like closed cooperatives can also operate without a
license. 119
B. THE HISTORY AND REGULATION OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS
Before the 1990s, Bolivian banks were highly inefficient with high ad-
ministrative costs because most of the banks were oligopolies. In order to
address these inefficiencies, by the mid to late 1980s, the Bolivian Gov-
ernment began responding with financial reform to weaken the oligopo-
lies and increase competition. 120 One of the first reforms that occurred
was liquidating state banks and weak private banks. 121 Secondly, the Bo-
livian Government modernized the legal framework by strengthening the
Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBEF) by giving
this regulatory group more autonomy from political pressure. 122 Moreo-
ver, the government also allowed institutions to accept foreign currency
in deposits, which encouraged foreign banks to enter into the Bolivian
market and increased competition. 123 The other significant reforms that
occurred were liberalizing interest rates, eliminating directed credit, and
reducing the levels of reserves required on deposits.' 24
With these reforms came the expansion of the informal sector and new-
found economic stability. Within a year of the policy reform,
microfinance NGOs began springing up on the Bolivian financial land-
scape. 125 Since state banks and weak private banks had closed as a result
of the financial reform, non-profit organizations began lending credit to
microentreprenuers. 12 6 The Bolivian financial sector continued to liber-
alize during the mid 1990s, and many of these NGOs transformed into
formalized microfinance institutions. One of the most successful trans-
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The SBEF regulates formal financial institutions and supervises com-
pliance with pertinent rules. At first, the only regulations that existed
were commercial banking regulations. 127 This proved to be problematic
to microfinance institutions since microfinance portfolios and organiza-
tional structure can be drastically different in commercial banks. There-
fore, during the early years of the transformation, the SBEF overlooked
some violations of commercial banking regulations. For example,
Prodem's unconventional portfolio of unsecured loans violated the bank-
ing regulations that any portfolio made up of more than ten percent un-
secured loans had to be provisioned at 100%.128 The SBEF allowed
microfinance institutions to continue to operate despite violations of
some key commercial banking norms. This selective enforcement al-
lowed administrative costs to remain relatively low for these institutions.
In 1995, NGOs worked with SBEF to create a new regulatory frame-
work for microfinance delivery in order "to become licensed in-
termediaries without having to meet all the requirements to become a
commercial bank, particularly requirements relating to minimum capital
and some of the more sophisticated banking operations (current accounts
and financial trade)."'1 2 9 During this time, SBEF developed the FFPs,
which had significantly lower capital requirements. These FFPs could
also mobilize savings and were subject to the same prudential and non-
prudential norms as banks. Moreover, the SBEF also developed a regu-
latory and supervisory framework for open cooperatives that strength-
ened these organizations by giving these organizations incentives to be
regulated by SBEF and gain access to deposits from the public.130
The new regulatory framework and corresponding increased liberaliza-
tion encouraged competition within the microfinance sector. This compe-
tition has driven down price and increased quality of services. Bolivia has
one of the lowest interest rates on micro loans in Latin America. In addi-
tion to regulated MFIs, the NGO sector in Bolivia also remains extremely
active in microfinance delivery and serves a large number of clients.1 3'
C. THE BANCOSOL EXAMPLE: THE PROFITABILITY OF
COMMERCIALIZATION
In 1992, Banco Solidario (BancoSol) became the first microfinance
NGO to transform into a commercialized MFI. The commercialized of
BancoSol allowed it to become financially independent and expand its
loan portfolio to service more clients.1 32 From 1997-1999, BancoSol was
considered the "best local financial entity" by most business newspapers
127. Id. at 12-13.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 13.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 14.
132. Counsel on Hemispheric Affairs, BancoSol: Mission Drift in Microfinance Institu-
tions, available at http://www.coha.org/2008/08/bancosol-mission-drift-in-microfi-
nance-institutions/.
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in Latin America 133 While most Bolivian banks struggled to maintain the
twelve percent capital adequacy requirement, BancoSol's twenty-nine
percent return on equity in 1998 made it one of the top performing
banks. 134 In 1992, when BancoSol was still an NGO called Prodem, the
organization serviced about 17,000 clients and had approximately four
million dollars in assets. 135 By the end of 2007, BancoSol services over
160,000 clients with over $300 million in loan portfolios.136 BancoSol's
reputation as a profitable MFI became well known internationally, and its
example has been imitated not only in Bolivia but throughout the
world.137
Although BancoSol has become an example for profitable
microfinance, whether it remains committed to its mission of alleviating
poverty is more questionable. For example, although BancoSol claims to
still be committed to exclusively servicing the poor, twenty percent of its
clients are not considered poor and eighty percent are not exclusively
under the poverty line. 138 Moreover, BancoSol's increase in average loan
size also indicates that the MFI has drifted away from financing the Bo-
livian poor. In 1992, when the Prodem first transformed into BancoSol,
the average loan size was $ 326 (USD).139 However, by 1997, the average
loan amount increased to $904.140 By the end of 2007, the average loan
amount increased to $1,200.141 The steady increase in loan amount indi-
cates that borrowers are coming from higher income levels since poor
clients cannot afford large loans. In addition, the interest rates also ap-
pear to be higher than the interest rates available at non-profit
microfinance organizations. 142 Notwithstanding this discrepancy, interest
rates at BancoSol still tend to be relatively low due to competition within
the Bolivian microfinance sector. 143
D. MICROFINANCE AND ECONOMIC CRISES IN BOLIVIA
By 1999, Bolivia became a victim of its own early success. The rise of
profitable banking institutions in Bolivia led to aggressive competition
and ultimately caused over-lending. 144 Clients began taking advantage of
133. Elisabeth Rhyne, supra note 120, at 4.
134. Id.
135. MIX Market, Profile for BancoSol, available at http://www.mixmarket.org/en/de-
mand/demand.show.profile.asp?ett=280.
136. Id.
137. ELISABETH RHYNE, supra note 120, at 4.
138. Jenna Barzelay Counsel on Hemispheric Affairs, BancoSol: Mission Drift in
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offers for quick and easy credit, which resulted in individuals having mul-
tiple loans from various institutions. In fact, many individuals maintained
two or more loans outstanding at one time. As a result, clients began
borrowing more than they could handle which increased delinquency.
Overindebtedness coupled with macroeconomic slowdown greatly cur-
tailed progress in the financial arena. Banks that were once extremely
prolific were experiencing economic setbacks for the first time in over a
decade. The financial sector was not the only area affected by economic
downturn. Rather, the overindebtedness mixed with growing Latin
American recession caused upheaval throughout Bolivian society. Mas-
sive protests, dangerous demonstrations, and social backlash against for-
mal financial institutions ensued. 14 5
By the end of 1999, the consumer credit movement had crashed. In
order to revive some of the larger consumer lending institutions, the Su-
perintendent intervened directly into those institutions by injecting
money.146 However, despite the Superintendent's attempts, the investors
of these banks lost money and refused to make any new loans. 147 The
collapse of consumer credit directly affected microenterprise lending, al-
though to a lesser extent. Because MFIs also participated in the rush to
lend more money, they also witnessed delinquency to an unprecedented
level.148
In order to respond to the delinquency, MFIs began using the credit
bureau more vigorously to determine whether potential clients had out-
standing loans or had delinquency in the past. 149 Moreover, the Superin-
tendent passed tougher regulations regarding the securitization of loans.
Microlenders began placing greater emphasis on repayment capacity rela-
tive to past performance. 150 Furthermore, the Superintendent and MFIs
began placing more emphasis on tangible collateral. A new law was
passed that allowed individuals to mortgage equipment in order to secure
collateral. 15 1 Although increasing collateral requirements decreases the
possibility of delinquency, it also makes financial services less available
for the poor.
These regulations have resuscitated the microfinance sector to a certain
extent. However, the financial crises of 1999-2000 greatly weakened the
industry to the point where pre-crises growth rates have become a rem-
nant of the past. BancoSol lost twenty-five percent of its clients between
1999 and 2000 and its return on equity plummeted from twenty-nine per-
cent in 1998 to four percent in 2000.152 Furthermore, delinquency in the
regulated microfinance sector increased from 2.4% in 1997 to 11.2% by
145. Id. at 12.
146. Id. at 13.
147. Id.
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the end of 1999.153 Since the economic crises, microfinance has slowly
regained strength. In order for Bolivian microfinance to continue to
thrive, the MFIs will need to develop innovative strategies to maintain
good performance and encourage growth.154
V. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: LESSONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Mexican and Bolivian example has shown us that increased com-
mercialization can have definite benefits for microfinance because it en-
courages financial independence, diversification of products and greater
outreach. Commercialization in microfinance, however, is a double-
edged sword. The idea that profit can be made while chipping away at
poverty may not seem objectionable at first glance. In fact, this idea
spurred the growth of microfinance throughout the world and captured
the support of many international development organizations such as
ACCION and the United Nations.
Although profit-making and poverty alleviation do not have to be in-
herently mutually exclusive, the emergence of profit-seeking players in
the field raises the possibility that instead of being a poverty alleviation
tool, microfinance is increasingly becoming a mechanism to exploit the
poor for a quick profit. 155 For example, in Mexico, where the govern-
ment does not require disclosure of interest rates, for-profit MFIs such as
Compartamos are charging interest rates close to 100%. Although high
interest rates can be attributable to high administrative costs and infla-
tion, for profit institutions charge much higher rates than their NGO
counterparts. The high interest rates and collateral requirements make it
more and more difficult for the poor to gain access to financial services or
to pay off their debt. Moreover, if MFIs began loaning larger amounts,
which is a phenomenon that has been occurring in Bolivia since its last
financial crisis, the extremely poor will be unable to borrow because of
their lack of collateral. When shareholders enter the microfinance pic-
ture, priorities can easily shift from poverty alleviation to the maximiza-
tion of profit. This shift in priority may not only be detrimental to the
poor but also to the economy as a whole.
A. REFLECTIONS ON THE SUBPRIME CRISES: LESSONS
FOR MICROFINANCE
In many ways, the subprime mortgage lending carries the same risk
involved in microfinance. With increase pressure to turn around quick
profits, lenders may engage in predatory practices and encourage over-
153. Id.
154. Ulrike Vogelgesang, Microfinance in times of crises: the effects of competition, ris-
ing indebtedness and economic crises on repayment behavior, 31 WORLD DEV.
2085, 2085 (2003).
155. Barbara Kiviat, The Big Trouble in Small Loans, TIME, June 5 2008, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1812051,00.html.
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indebtedness. One of the major reasons why the subprime scandal oc-
curred was because lenders were disproportionally targeting "lower-
income people and places with higher priced products offered on inferior
terms. ' 156 Many of the subprime loans were complex, confusing, and de-
ceptive to borrowers. Currently, microfinance instrument are relatively
simple and very little evidence of widespread delinquency exists. Never-
theless, as more for profit institutions enter into the microfinance busi-
ness and aggressive competition ensues, the possibility of predatory
practices increases. To avoid such practices, countries should implement
truth in lending laws for microfinance that require disclosures of key
terms, increases transparency in the lending system, and standardizes
methods of calculating costs.
Another contributing factor to the subprime crises was speculative
thinking on the part of the buyers. 157 Many U.S. borrowers took out
loans in good faith with the expectation that they would be able to pay
back the debt through their "investment." However, when the housing
bubble burst and prices within the housing market plummeted, delin-
quencies increased. Speculative thinking in microfinance also exists.
Similar to homebuyers, microentreprenuers take out loans with the ex-
pectation that through their business ventures they will be able to pay
back the loans. Nevertheless, microcredit is also very different from the
U.S. subprime lending because microloans tend to be much smaller than
the subprime home loans. Moreover, delinquency rates are low in
microfinance. As witnessed in Mexico and Bolivia, further commerciali-
zation encourages the diversification and sophistication of financial in-
struments. These changes increase the possibility of default. Therefore,
microfinance organizations must invest in researching consumer behav-
ior, developing sustainable and responsive products and carefully select-
ing borrowers. Although this paper does not recommend increasing
collateral requirements, as this would make microloans less accessible,
this paper does recommend limiting lending to entrepreneurial activities.
In Mexico, for example, MFIs are increasingly lending microloans for
consumer activities that have very little expected return. To illustrate,
Compartamos, has been known to grant small loans with very high inter-
est rates to buy stereos or television sets. This type of lending is unsus-
tainable and will contribute to overindebtedness.
In addition to the speculative thinking and predatory practices, the sub-
prime crises also resulted from an over-reliance on credit scores and the
failure of the underwriting processes. Instead of conducting an in-depth
analysis of risk and performance of the various portfolios, investors relied
heavily upon credit ratings. In essence, lenders failed to exercise due dili-
gence and oversight. 158 For microfinance institutions, credit rating sys-
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tems can be an invaluable tool. However, the subprime crises should
show MFIs that credit scores alone are insufficient. MFIs must actively
engage in careful analysis of borrowers and implement adequate controls
to ensure high quality portfolios performance. 159 MiFIs should reflect
upon the early days of microfinance where NGOs would take the time to
interview family, friends, neighbors, and business contacts to determine
loan worthiness.
B. A NEED FOR BALANCED GOVERNMENT REGULATION
A way to address the negative effects of commercialization is through
sufficient government regulation and supervision. Some microfinance ad-
vocates claim that government presence in microfinance is detrimental
because regulations increase administrative costs and may cause banks
and other for-profit institutions to exit the field. Notwithstanding, with-
out sufficient oversight, microfinance delivery can become exploitative
and detrimental to the poor.
One major area that microfinance can be exploitative is through charg-
ing egregious interest rates. This paper does not recommend imposing
interest caps since administrative costs and inflation can vary and drasti-
cally affect interest rates. One mechanism for maintaining low interest
rates is through encouraging competition. Governments should support
microfinance NGOs in their non-profit form and allow them to grow.
Moreover, governments should also provide incentives to businesses to
keep interest rates low. For example, through tax rebates and other in-
centives, governments could reward companies that charge lower interest
rates and forgo large profits in microfinance delivery.
To lower administrative costs and hence decrease interest rates, gov-
ernments should apply a flexible and balanced approach to regulation.
For instance, Bolivian microfinance greatly benefited when the Superin-
tended used unbiased judgment and employed selective enforcement of
rules to lower administrative costs for NGOs when they were transition-
ing into specialized financial institutions. One very important mechanism
for decreasing administrative costs and encouraging growth is to allow
microfinance institutions to take deposits. While Bolivia allows this,
Mexican SOFELEs and SOFEMEs cannot take deposits from the public,
which may be contributing to the extremely high interest rates for these
organizations.
Self-Regulation through regulatory boards may also decrease adminis-
trative costs. However, as seen with the Mexican federation system when
the regulatory board is composed of members of the MFIs, it can lead to
conflicts of interest. Therefore, while self-regulation may decrease costs,
there must be sufficient government oversight to guarantee impartiality.
Because of the possibility of partiality, the regulatory boards at the MFIs
should only handle non-prudential regulations. Prudential regulations
159. Id.
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should be handled by an independent government agency that is knowl-
edgeable of the microfinance industry.
C. A NEED FOR GREATER INFRASTRUCTURE
Another lesson that both Bolivia and Mexico has demonstrated
through their experience with microfinance is the need for better infra-
structure. Greater investment must be made in infrastructure to give the
poor better access to financial services. For example, in Bolivia rural pen-
etration in microfinance remains relatively low with less than fifty percent
of the rural poor having access to financial services. In contrast, 100% of
the urban poor in Bolivia have access to microfinance services.
Better roads and transportation will allow the rural poor to access ur-
ban banks. Governments should also encourage MFIs to operate in rural
areas. Movement into rural areas will not only increase access to the
poor but will also avoid saturation in the urban market. In Bolivia, MFIs
are slowly moving into rural services as a result of fierce competition and
oversaturation. In countries where MFIs lack motivation to move into
the rural market because of low profit incentives, governments may con-
sider offering tax rebates and temporary subsidies for rural microfinance
delivery.
In addition to roads and transportation, countries should make greater
investments into community infrastructure such as water sanitation and
sewage. These types of investments make it more likely that low-income
entrepreneurs will be successful at their business ventures and decrease
delinquency rates. Investments into community property, especially in
rural areas, will allow for a better overall business environment not only
for the poor but for the country as a whole.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS:
BALANCING PROFITS WITH PURPOSE
In addition to government action, MFIs themselves must take a proac-
tive role in maintaining their sustainability. By incorporating profit-mo-
tives into microfinance delivery, some MFIs have lost touch with their
original purpose of servicing the poor, and instead engage in practices
that will possibly exploit or neglect the poor. "Mission drift" has become
a problem in microfinance and threatens the long-term viability of these
institutions. Mission drift is apparent both in Mexico and Bolivia. In
Mexico, although only one-third of the poor have access to financial ser-
vices and face extremely high interest rates, shareholders of MFIs reap in
millions in profits. The initial public offering of Compartamos allowed
the top executives of the bank to gain over one hundred million in profit.
Similarly, in Bolivia, the steadily increasing loan amounts and collateral
requirements of for-profit MFIs make it increasingly more difficult for
the poor to access financial services.
While these profit-seeking actions may allow investors to turn around
quick profits, neglecting or exploiting the poor in microfinance delivery
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dooms the industry to failure. In order to maintain sustainability and
avoid greater mission drift, MEFIs should use great care in choosing mem-
bers of the board of directors. MFIs should choose members that have
experience and knowledge in microfinance delivery and are committed to
long-term viability rather than turning around quick profits. In addition
to choosing board members, MFI should also exercise due diligence in
choosing clients. MFIs should consider the prospective client's purported
use of the loan, past repayment history, number of outstanding loans and
community reputation. Moreover, MFIs should disclose all key provi-
sions in financial documents to clients and implement programs that edu-
cate clients on the financial services and repayment responsibilities.
In times of economic downturns, MFIs should shift their focus from
increasing scale to maintaining financial viability. 160 Instead of ex-
panding the number of clients or services, MFIs should concentrate on
managing and monitoring portfolio quality. Additionally, MFIs should
conduct in depth cost analysis for the financial services offered. In doing
so MFIs should ask themselves which customer segments are more or less
costly to serve, which products are more or less financially viable and how
can they streamline products to meet demand. Lastly, in saturated mar-
kets and slow economies, MFIs should consider consolidation. Consoli-
dation can offer a solution to liquidity problems because it allows MFIs to
merge pooled assets and increases attractiveness to capital investors.
Furthermore, consolidation may encourage economies of scale and re-
duce operating expenses.
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Over the past two decades, microfinance has undergone a dramatic
transformation, evolving from a grassroots movement to a booming com-
mercial industry. Through greater commercial presence, microfinance
delivery has not only become more sophisticated and formalized, but has
also allowed for greater access to the poor. Commercial microfinance
institutions serve millions of clients all over the world and do a great deal
towards poverty alleviation. Latin America, in particular, has one of the
oldest and most successful microfinance movements in the world.
The Mexican and Bolivian experience with microfinance illustrates
both the positive and negative effects of commercialization. In both of
these countries, microfinance delivery has transformed from small-scale
NGOs to large for profit specialized microfinance institutions. This trans-
formation has expanded access to the Latin American poor and en-
couraged diversification in financial products. Because these
organization can operate without donations and grants, they are generally
more sustainable than their non-profit predecessors. While profit making
in microfinance has its positive effects, it can also lead to exploitation and
160. Yana Watson, From Crises to Catharsis: How Microfinance Can Make it through
the Global Recession 11 MICROFINANCE INSIGHTS 13-15 (Apr. 2009), available at
www.microfinanceinsights.com.
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overindebtedness. Like the U.S. subprime credit market, microfinance is
also susceptible to failure from too much greed and irresponsible lending.
In Mexico and Bolivia the microfinance sector has experienced great suc-
cess but has also been susceptible to mission drift.
The commercialization of microfinance necessitates a delicate balance
of regulation and growth. In order to maintain a profitable and sustaina-
ble microfinance industry, the government must used a balanced and flex-
ible approach to regulating and invest in infrastructure for the poor.
MFIs must also do their part by maintaining focus on portfolio quality
and using ethical and transparent lending practices. By balancing flexible
government oversight with MFI self-regulation, microfinance will con-
tinue to be a positive force in our society both as a poverty alleviation
tool and as a growth opportunity for commercial enterprises.
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